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Elite Family Practices and State-Making in the -Early Modern Netherlands l 
Julia Adams 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
'"There is scarcely less trouble in governing a family than in governing an entire state" 
(Montaigne, 1958 [15801: 175). 
In early modern Europe, states and elite families were often so interlocked as  to be 
indistinguishable -- then Montaigne's rueful aphorism was especially apt. Yet state-making and 
family.history are generally studied separately today. I will try to unite.them by underlining the 
central role of family lineages and identities in the formation of political structures and authority, 
focussing on the Netherlands, a precocious and influential developer.along a number of social and 
cultural dimensions. My thinking about this problem has been guided by several general questions. 
How and when did elite families and lineages anchor social stability,.or contribute to social 
change? What were the implications for political authority and state-making? This paper will 
make two main claims: first, that family practices and ideologies (including inheritance, marriage, 
and the organization of authority along patriarchal lines) structured and limited the development 
of patrimonial states; and second, that the resulting dominant class/family/state organization 
influenced national and international politico-economic processes. In particular, I will argue that 
elite family dynamics in the Netherlands were one cause of that country's spectacular rise and 
decline. 
I. 'Patrimonial Elites and Privilege 
I t  is well known that early modern European elites persistently pursued state offices and 
privileges -- a practice known as the kulDerii (machinations) or ambtsbelae: (hunt for office) in the 
Dutch ~ e ~ u b l i c . ~  Contemporaries wrote stilted poetry hailing ofice and the prerogatives of 
IA previous draft of this paper was presented a t  the 1991 Social Science History Association 
annual meeting, and a t  the Program in the Comparative Study of Social Transformations, and the 
Family Studies Seminar, both a t  the University of Michigan. I would also like to thank Nancy 
Curtin, Femme Gaastra, and Els van Eyck van Heslinga for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. The paper draws on some of the dissertation research I conducted in the Netherlands, 
which was funded by the Social Science Research Council. 
2 ~ e  Witte van Citters reviews instances of the ubiquitous pursuit of privilege in eighteenth- 
century Europe (1875: v-xxxii). 
privilege as a source of political power and a badge of status. "Happy Hasselaars!" enthused a 
typical ode on the occasion of a marriage in the Dutch regency, in this case between the cousins 
Gerhard Hasselaar and Suzanne Hasselaar in Amsterdam in 1752. "The country has placed in 
your tutelary hands / The sword of Themis and the Depot of the Laws..:" The poet further abjured 
Gerhard to exercize his offices in the illustrious tradition of his patrician ancestors (AGA 292: 
#1739). Contemporaries also thought of money.'"Everyone knows that the quickest way to get 
rich is to get into the government and that is the reason that men pay to get in," wrote the'Dutch 
pamphleteer Claudius Civilis in 1747 (De Jong, 1985: 38). At the pinnacles of patrimonial states, 
economic rewards (and risks) could indeed be enormous: witness Richelieu's "fruits of office", the 
largest fortune accumulated in France until that time, or the dramatic trajectories of Essex, the 
Cecils, and other Tudor and Stuart g r a n d e e ~ . ~ l n  the Netherlands, the regent patriciate received 
fixed""rentsW or intermittent windfalls from office, such a s  the -'s (sheriff's) percentage of the 
fines he imposed (Vries, 1977: 330), an income which could be quite extensive, especially in the 
eighteenth century (Smit, 1977: 388-go).* Beyond serving a s  a direct source of resources, state 
offices and privileges were a vehicle for broad control over the conditions of making and keeping 
money, and over economic affairs generally. Dutch regents, for example, who invested on over 
half their fortunes in state bonds in the eighteenth century, also used their positions in the state to 
decide the interest rates that their loans would command, and to block reforms in the fiscal system 
that seemed disadvantageous to them.5 
Although they have quarrelled over whether economics, politics or ideology were prime 
movers in the reproduction of patrimonial social structures,-most students of these states and 
societies recognize that an elite's capacity to accumulate resources was a t  least empirically bound 
up with its capacity to impress and command. At minimum, certain approved styles of 
conspicuous consumption and display were an important means to an economic end for an aspiring 
3 ~ o r  the sources of Richelieu's fortune, see Joseph Bergin's Cardinal Richeheu: Power and the 
Pursuit of W e a b  (1985). On the Tudor and Stuart office-holding grandees, see Lawrence Stone's 
The Crisis of the A 
. . 
(1965: 398-504) and his Familv and Fo 
. . 
r i s t o a c v  1558-1641 rtune. Studies in 
Aristocratic Finance in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cent&(l973). Paul Bamford's P r iv i l ee  
ofit: A Business Familv in Eighteenth-Centurv France (1988) usefully disaggregates three 
major types of privilege that underpinned 18th century French business fortunes: seigneurial 
domain, venal office, and state monopoly. 
4"~egents" are conventionally defined as  occupants of high state offices; in practice, they are a 
subset of the "elite", which also includes member9 of the landed gentry and merchant and 
industrial capitalists who do not hold office. 
5 ~ h e  best English-language source on how the Dutch patricians structured the terms of their own 
Inter - l a n c e  and the Ams- Capital Market. loans to the state is Riley, n 
1740-1815 (1980: 68-82). 
member of the elite, and that some form of feudal or patrimonial privilege, with the coercive 
apparatus to back i t  up, and the clientele and allies it produced, was a necessary path to ~ e a l t h . ~  
But patrimonial privilege was not merely a means to an end: it was embedded in and reproduced a 
relationship between rulers and elites that was inextricably political a d  economic, based 
simultaneously on authority and economic exchange. When a ruler-granted exclusive politico- 
economic rights and immunities to self-governing corporate groups, he was also gathering funds 
and deploying power, while corporate elites in turn got economic concessions, political 
representation and derived status (Weber, 1968 [1922]: 226, 293-7, 1006-7, 1010-13, 1022, 
1028-31). If elites were to maintain their social position, they depended on this peculiarly 
patrimonial privilege which functioned as  property, which could be acquired, traded, even sold or 
passed on to descendants, which carried the right to sanction subordinates, and which offered a 
share in the ruler's legitimacy.7 
In the northern Netherlands, a powerful urban regent patriciate, primarily based in 
v r o e d s c b  (town councils) and privileged corporate monopolies like the East and West lndies . 
-Companies, faced a series of weak patrimonial rulers -- first the Habsburgs' delegates,'followed by 
emissaries of France and England, and finally the indigenous stadholders, the Princes of 
The regents consistently resisted their would-be rulers' efforts to govern, opposing efforts to create 
new corporations or revive traditional or fictive ones, to appoint relatively autonomous 
bureaucrats, or to call on alliances with other patrimonial powers. Such policies, however 
traditionally acceptable, threatened to disperse and devalue elite privilege, or even to abolish it 
6 ~ h i s  was especially true of courtly societies, but even a burghers' paradise like Holland 
maintained "a rich tradition of ceremonial waste" (Schama, 1987: 310). The limits to this type of 
politico-economic accumulation were graphically illustrated by Fouquet, unseated by his envious 
patron, Louis XIV (Dessert, 1987). 
7 ~ t  is important to underline that both "privilege" and the reproduction of the patrimonial polity 
itself were rooted in "traditional values" which, a s  Mark Gould puts it, "necessitate a legitimation 
of innovation in terms of past practice" (Gould, 1987: 168). In such polities, notes Gianfranco 
Poggi, corporate bodies were "constrained chiefly by the concurrent, traditional rights vested in 
other individuals and bodies" (1990: 48-9). Yes: although neither Gould's nor Poggi's otherwise 
excellent books recognizes that these bodies were shaped- and honeycombed by family cliques, and 
that the "traditional" rights and values on which they were based were patriarchal and familial. I 
discuss this issue further below. 
80n the Habsburg period, the most useful English-language source is Tracy's Holland u n k  
urP Rule. 1506-1566 (1990). Subsequent quasi-monarchical "protectors", chosen on the 
basis of Dutch alliances with France and England, were ousted after they tried to bend Dutch 
foreign policy to the dictates of the French and English crowns (Schoffer, 1988: 146-52). From 
that point, the 1579 defensive pact among several provincial estates against Spain served as the 
blueprint for the new state, coexisting uneasily with the stadholder's traditional rights (Groenveld 
and Leeuwenberg, 1979: 29-51). 
altogether. Yet the regents could not simply dispense with their opposite numbers, for even in the 
.. . 
so-called stadholderless Eras of True Freedom (Ware V r i l M  when the regents temporarily 
governed alone, their own politico-economic position and legitimacy derived from the ruler's 
intertwined executive capacities and symbolic incarnation of sovereign ~ n i t ~ . ~ * H e r e  was the Dutch 
version of the classic "patrimonial paradox", and the source of the source of the characteristic 
oscillations of patrimonial politics, likened by contemporaries to a pendulum, or a balance scale. 
Whether corporate elites managed to gain control of state offices, resulting in the "estatist" 
patrimonialism characteristic of the  etherl lands, lo or the ruler to assert politico-economic 
authority over elites, in the "absolutist" tendency evident in France, the interdependence between 
the two undermined any definitive institutional compromise or solution. l l 
This uneasy arrangement was strained to the breaking-point in a number of early modern 
'European countries. In seventeenth-century agrarian England, according to Robert-Brenner, the 
system was riven by two "fundamental, interrelated discontinuities". First, argues Brenner, ,"the 
country's landlords no longer maintained themselves economically by their capacity directly to 
coerce a possessing peasantry, a capacity which had depended on membership in various kinds of 
local, regional, and national patrimonial or household-centered political communities or groups." 
Second, "the Crown, while remaining itself a patrimonial lord with the capacity to maintain itself 
by virtue of its privately possessed political powers, had ceased to depend for its government on 
lords who, by virtue of their own political organizations, often centered upon the households of 
great bastard magnates, had their own private access to the means of coercion, their own 
g t ~ h e  customary way the history of the Dutch Republic is told, which makes the government of 
States-with-stadholder the normal pattern and the two stadholderless periods ... interruptions that 
distort the pattern," notes Rowen in The Princes of Oran~e .  The Stadholders in the Dutch 
k u b l i c ,  "may be a s  false as  the opposite vision of the followers of De Witt in his own time and in 
subsequent generations who saw the Republic in its purity as government without a stadholder" 
(1988: 110-11; see also 95-130, 148-62). The eighteenth-century political reformer Simon van 
Slingelandt crisply posed the alternatives to his fellow regents: either they submit to the 
stadholder, or find another way of submitting (s- their squabbles to adjudication; if not, 
"government without stadholders" would be merely "full-fledged anarchy" (Van Slingelandt: 1784 
[17 171: 4-5; 1784 117221: 94-96). The incapacity of estatist organization to resolve major political 
crisis did provoke a return to a strengthened, hereditary stadholderate in 1747. 
losee Weber's "rule by -riatom (notables)" (1968: 1009-10; 1038-42). "Estatism" is 
preferable, because it makes explicit the parallelism to absolutism. 
0 
l l ~ l s e w h e r e  (1990) I have argued that this oscillation was common to all patrimonial systems. 
Holders of patrimonial privileges and offices were tied to ruling regimes, but could, when 
threatened, play an important part in resisting them: thus the vacillation of office-holders in the 
French Fronde (Moote 1971), or of chartered company merchants in the English Revolution 
(Brenner 1992). Elite capacities for resisting rulers were also formed by their ability to survive in . 
the interstices of the dominant system, or to parlay their privileges into new types of purely 
economic advantage. 
authority within a limited territory, and thus their own effective right and capacity to govern 
within a given locale" (Brenner 1992: Postscript). More generally, wherever forms of politicdy- 
constituted property (or privately- or corporately-owned forms of power) remained in the hands of 
patrimonial elites -- even in countries like the Dutch Republic, where wage labor, rather than 
coercive exploitation of land-owning peasants, was the dominant type of surplus extraction -- the 
intra-elite squabbling characteristic of patrimonialism was increasingly accompanied by emergent 
tensions between patrimonial elites, dependent on corporate bodies as  key mechanisms in securing, 
maintaining and extending wealth, power and status, and independent agents who were not 
anchored in these bodies, and who called for new forms of political power divested of such 
"archaic" mutual obligations. 
Brenner attributes the emergence of such structural tensions, and the revolutions that 
ensued, to the rise of the capitalist mode of production. I will leave this causal issue aside for the 
moment, in order to deal with a sheoreti& absence in his and other analysts' accounts of the 
patrimonial system -- the family. The force of family and lineage was unmistakeably a 
constitutive factor in the development of early modern European political economies, whether they 
are characterized as  patrimonial, neo-feudal, predatory, absolutist, brokerage, taxloffice, tributary, 
fiscal/military, or agrarian bureaucratic (all terms currently in vogue, testifying to the extent of 
theoretical confusion). Yet analyses of the patrimonial system fail to do justice to either the key 
gendered, familial component of the motivations of elites and rulers, or the rules of reproduction of 
the system itself. l2 They have thus missed the range of social-structural and ideological outcomes 
that ensued. 
That family practices had political effects has been argued elsewhere. Dynastic struggle 
and decay have long been thought to affect political cycles (Khaldun, 1967 [1377-811: 133-42). 
The generalized exchange of women continues to be cited a s  a dynamic factor in kin-structured 
societies.13 Others have argued that concepts or ideologies of family and gender can provide a 
121n the Brenner quotation above, for example, the roles of family, household and lineage are 
registered empirically, but do not figure in the theory of the system. This has been the case with 
analyses of non-European patrimonial systems as  well, such as  Zeitlin's The Civil Wars in Chile 
(1984). 
1 3 ~ e e  Levi-Strauss (1949). For recent derivations, see Gailey's book on colonial state formation in 
the Tongan Islands (1987), Searle's rational-choice account of the exchange of women in pursuit of 
the construction of Norman power (1990), and Musisi on Bugandb! (1991). So far, no work 
revolving around the exchange of women has dealt adequately with the problem raised by Carolyn 
Steedman: "Under particular social circumstances, people may come to understand that whilst 
they do not possess anything, they possess themselves, and may possibly be able to exchange 
themselves for something else. Under such circumstances, there exists the specificity of a 
woman's situation, and the under-standing of herself as an object of exchange that may arise 
medium by which politics is conducted and contested (see among many others Applewhite and 
Levy (1990) whose collection deals specifically with early modern Europe). However, "family" has 
not been systematically integrated into social theories of transition from kin- to state-structured 
societies. Barring Weber's account of'"patrimonia1ism" in Economv and Societv (1968 [1922]), 
itself only a first step, the themes of family and state form, and certainly "gender", have been 
ignored by the canonical theoretical texts of early modern state formation. l4 This is so in spite of 
the fact that when the reproduction of a ruling elite rested on gendered family principles, including 
marriage, inheritance, and paternal authority, familial dynamics were also constitutive of societal 
modes of politico-economic reproduction: that is, they determined how political alliances were 
formed and how power was transferred, how new members of the elite were recruited, and how 
economic extraction and political rule were extended and legitimated. 
II. Family 'Practices and Genealogies of Privilege 
"The inheritor, the eldest son is-the land (or the firm) made flesh" (Bourdieu, 1990 [19801: 
152). 
The Bicker family archive in Amsterdam holds an emblematic document which testifies to 
both the Bickers' long representation in city government offices, and to the author Hendrik 
Bicker's pride in his family's record. Headed "Fourteen Generations Beginning with...", it spans a 
two-hundred-fifty year period from the 1400s to the 1680s, listing each Bicker male, his offices, 
the names of his wife or wives, his sons who also held office, and culminating with Hendrik 
himself, a t  that time an Bud-Schepen, a member of the magistracy (AGA 195: #36). The Bickers' 
is a particularly detailed example, but such documents are not unusual. l5 The regents excelled a t  
these hybrid "office genealogies", which were a t  once means of family survival, bids for power, 
and glorious clan narratives. 
Family heads, whether landed or mercantile, petty squire or ruler, were stirred by visions 
of their own ascendant lineages.16 Paulus Teding van Berkhout (1609-72), a member of the 
when she has some choice over reproduction, and can use herself and her children as  a traffic with 
the future" (Steedman, 1987: 68-9). 
1 4 ~ h e y  are absent, for example, from Giddens' The Nation-State and Violence (1985), Skocpol's 
States and Social Revolutions (l979), Mann's The Sources of Social Power (1986), Tilly's 
Coercion. C a ~ i t a l  and European St- (1990), Wallerstein's The Modern World Svstem (19791, 
and (in spite of its title) Anderson's Li n e a ~ s  of the Absolutist State (1979). 
151ater additions extend the lime to 1772. Another especially rich example, drawn up by B. 
Huydecoper, lists the chronology of high offices filled by generations of Huydecoper men in 
Amsterdam from 1578 to 1749 (RU 67: #4). 
Hague regency, typically reminded his children that they formed only "a link in a growing chain" 
of Van Berkhout generations, and that they should care for the wealth and possessions intended 
not only for their pleasure, but for the family's naPeslacht (descendants). l7 The "social fact" of 
cathexis impelled early modern family heads to mortgage the futures of themselves and their 
kin. l8 Inheritance practices were particularly central in their attempts to construct or maintain a 
functioning patrilineage. The legal mechanisms of primogeniture and entail had spread throughout 
Europe, in response to pressure by landed elites who wanted to keep their estates together for 
family posterity, although the rules were not a s  stringently enforced in the Netherlands as in 
some other European countries.19 Among the Dutch regent patriciate, great wealth and the 
relative mobility and divisibility of finance and merchant-capital stocks, major forms of regent 
assets, allowed daughters and younger sons to inherit some part of the patrimony. Nevertheless, 
the eldest son (or his functional substitute) was systematically preferred among both the landed 
gentry and urban patriciate, whether in inheritance of the family demesnes, or in filling the offices 
identified with the family, respectively. In both cases, father's and son's respective capacities to 
1 6 ~ h e  definition of "lineage" follows Plakans (1984: 213): "When analysed synchronically, it 
contains linked subsets of persons, all of whom are alive a t  the same time, recognize that they are 
descended from the same ancestor or have been brought into such a group by marriage or 
adoption, and express this sense of corporateness through common activities: rituals and 
behaviours that separate a particular subset from similar groups in other lineages. Analysed 
diachronically, the lineage (patrilineage, in this example) is understood: to have a "founder"; to 
persist in time either in the form of a single line, when each generation has only one male 
offspring, or in the form of branches, when there are several male offspring; and either to become 
extinct when males are no longer produced or to continue as  a fixture in a community's population 
as  a result of continuous production of males." 
1 7 ~ u o t e d  in Schmidt (1987: 133). See Stone and Stone (1986 [1984]: 79-91) for a witty 
discussion of indirect heirs and name-changing among the English landed elite: "a fiction that was 
a necessity if the ideal of family continuity was to be realized in practice" (91). 
1 8 ~ h e  social-psychological mechanisms of identification with "the line" have been addressed a t  . . various levels of theoretical ambition and historical specificity. In The Pohtlcs of ReDroductlon 
(1981), feminist theorist Mary O'Brien hypothesizes a primal paternal reproductive anxiety, a 
desire for control over "the seed", as the cause of attempts by men to control women's 
reproduction. In my view, we are better served by a less grandiose, more historicized focus. Two 
exemplary Freudian texts are Elizabeth Wirth Marvick's The Young Richelieu. A PsvchoanalvM 
h to Lea- (1983) and her Louis XIII: The Making of a King(1986). D 
19primogeniture appeared in areas of France in the early 11th century as  a response to a 
familially-driven fragmentation of holdings and patrimonies (Duby, 1976; Cooper, 1976: 252-76), 
and was increasingly combined with the entail of lands on a succession of tenants for life from the 
early sixteenth century (Thirsk, 1976). Among the early modern Dutch landed gentry, the best 
property went to the eldest son, but primogeniture was not ironclad (Marshall 1987). On 
primogeniture in general, see Gies and Gies (1987). 
dispose of family property were legally circumscribed in favor of descendants (Haks 1982, 1988; 
Aalbers and Prak 1987; Marshall 1987).~O 
For the regents especially, office, rather than land, held the key to future family fortunes. 
Aspiring regent families sacrified to get prospective heirs into office, if not in this generation, in 
the next.-The path open to the would-be regent's son and heir was less formally codified than it 
was in France, where patrimonial privilege and office were also closely coupled to elite economic 
wellbeing and reputation, defining the route to inter-generational reproduction of family position, 
but where even high office could be bought and directly conveyed by deed of inheritance (Mousnier, 
1971 [19451; Giesey, 1977). In contrast, most high offices in the Netherlands could not be directly 
bought and sold, or formally inherited. Elites did buy minor but lucrative state offices for their 
progeny, such as the venal postmasterships, but they also sought to have prospective heirs 
appointed to non-venal offices, which lay a t  the outset of a conventionally understood career path, 
one which would end in a directorship of a privileged corporate body, such a s  the East Indies 
Company, a seat on the vroedschar, (town council), or even access to the inner circle of the 
vroedscha, the b u g e x n e e s t e r s u  (mayoralty). If all went well, the heir would eventually either 
ascend into the regency, or (if his father were already a regent) replace him as the family head 
and its political representative.21 Of the first thirty-six Amsterdam y r o e d s c k  members in newly 
independent Holland (installed in 1578), only nine who had available male descendants or relatives 
were not succeeded by them a t  their deaths, a pattern which characterized the Amsterdam 
patriciate until the end of the early modern period (Elias, 1903-5: xlii; Tab. VII). Furthermore, for 
much of this period, nepotism was seen as  perfectly acceptable: the eighteenth-century diarist who 
commented uncritically that Mayor Bicker of Amsterdam had earmarked the sinecure of 
vendumeester van sche~en en koo-nscha~~en. "worth 6000 guilders a year," for his fourteen- 
year-old son Henrik appears to be typical (quoted in Van Nierop, 1939: 220). Positive normative 
expectations extended beyond the nuclear family to the wider kin network, and cut both ways. 
Hence Jacob van Citters, mayor of Middelburg, regularly answered letters from office-seekers 
20~rimogeniture, entail and their functional substitutes have thus seemed to some commentators, 
such a s  Francis Bacon, to undermine paternal authority, but if the locus of family honor and 
paternal .authority is understood to reside not in the individual or the nuclear family but in the 
lineage, necessitating that "the lineage should enjoy a wealth, dignity, and authority 
commensurate to its inherited status and right" (James, 1974: 184), it is less surprising that the 
strengthening of entail is generally accompanied by stronger patrilineal prerogatives. See Cooper 
(1976). 
2 1 ~ h i s  career pattern resembles those identified for other patrimonial elites. See for example 
Moreau on the Liege patricians (1978), Forster (1980) and Giesey (1977) on the ancien repime 
French bourgeoisie. 
stamped with his own family tree, indicating the relationship of the petitioner to the mayor up to 
the sixth degree (Coumans, 1984: 103). 
Those who aspired to family glory and who wanted to install or maintain their families in 
the sanctum of high office, also had to practice huweliiksgolitiek, the "politics of marriage": to 
marry well, and marry their children well. "Men frequently regarded marriage in terms of what it 
would do for their line" (1987: 51), concludes Sherrin Marshall, referring to the early modern 
Dutch landed gentry; the same was true of urban regents. Marriage gave a family normative 
claims on the allied family's patrimonial privileges and off~ces (which could, in the case of lesser 
offices, be directly acquired via dowries); it created a web of political supporters, and it polished 
family prestige -- factors which were important in helping families gain or maintain 
ascendancy.22 Regent families thus kept careful genealogical records, not only of their own 
pedigrees, but of other office-holding families with which they had intermarried, and sometimes of 
those with which intermarriage was considered plausible. The powerful Backer family, for 
example, researched or collected the genealogies of 320 Amsterdam patrician families, many of 
which were related by marriage to the Backer clan, as well as  drawing up huge chronological lists 
of Amsterdam families which had boasted one or more mayors 'from '1343 to 1727 (AGA PA172: 
#40-45, 104). The importance of marriage to elite and especially regent families was also evinced 
in the close management of children's marital prospects, culminating in complex and protracted 
negotiations between the family heads who were considering whether to consent to the alliance, 
giving rise to detailed contingency planning and regulative documents (AGA 195, #60, #61, #66, 
#73, #79). 
If all parties sacrificed for "the lineage" in the regent family, the sacrifice was unevenly 
distributed along the lines of age and gender. Younger sons were systematically disadvantaged in 
comparison to eldest sons. The higher offices were traditionally reserved for the latter, even when 
a town charter did not limit the number of immediate family members that could sit on the town 
council, and younger sons were relegated to lesser offices, and roles a s  supporters and permanent 
u n d e r ~ t u d i e s . ~ ~  The agency of daughters was even more circumscribed. A marriageable daughter ' 
2 2 ~ o r  specific case studies which attest to the multiple functions of marriage for regent families, 
see among others De Jong (1985) on Gouda; Kooijmans (1985) on Hoorn; De Lange (1972) on 
Medemblik; Porta (1975) on Amsterdam; Prak (1985) on Leiden. The pioneering work on a . . 
mlliere~ering ("familial regime"), one which rested on the sons-in-law of the family head, was 
Jorissen's (1887), for the town of Gorinchem. See also Vreede (1836). 
2331s van Eyck van Heslinga drew my attention to one younger son's struggle to depart from the 
norm: an 18th-century case in Rotterdam, in which a younger brother in the Gevers family, who 
had temporarily filled his bankrupt older brother's woe- seat, tried to retain it when the 
latter returned from the East Indies (ARA 2.21.070). More typical "modes of exit" for younger 
sons included marrying into a regent family in another town (becoming the surrogate son and heir 
could function as  a medium of exchange and a guarantor of trust, enabling her father to retrieve 
his financial position, or to construct and consolidate politico-economic alliances with other men.24 
Her "virtue" symbolized the honor and integrity of both the patrimonial line from which she came 
and that which she would join and perpetuate; not surprisingly, women's sexuality and marital 
prospects were more closely regulated than In short, the rules of reproduction of the 
patrilineage elevated the position of men over that of women, and eldest over youngest, with the 
fwst rule superseding the second (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: Chapter 2). But it is important to stress 
that no one was exempt: the negative sanctions levelled a t  perceived mesalliances included those 
contracted by the head of the family himself. 
There were certainly differences between the family practices of landed elites and the 
urban patriciate in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, both were characterized by patrilineal 
inheritance and marriage practices, whether focussed on retaining and expanding landed estates 
or on office, or both, like the noble dynasties of van Heeckeren, Bentinck or the Schimmelpenninck 
van der Oye, which "provided personnel for all the commanding posts of the military, ecclesiastical 
and judicial hierarchies" (Schama 1977: 76-7).26 The ranking noble family, the House of Orange, 
which held vast landed holdings in Nassau, also asserted dynastic rights to property in the highest 
office of the land, the stadholderate. Beginning with William I, hailed as &r Vaderlands 
("father of the Fatherland"), the Princes of Orange invoked the legitimating ideologies of paternal 
authority and dynasty in attempts to claim or consolidate the sovereign authority they insisted 
accompanied that office, and they drew on their marital alliances when seeking to extend their 
authority to new territorial or substantive domains (e.g. Poelhekke 1978: 151-53; Rowen 1988: 
137). In this they were less successful than their continental royal counterparts, but not wholly so. 
if that family lacked one), or making enough money, generally in European or Indies trade, to 
found a collateral branch of the family, again in another town. It  would be interesting to know 
whether the marriages and migrations of younger sons to other towns or provinces solidified wider 
geographic bonds among elites. The question, unanswerable a t  the moment, has obvious 
implications for nation-building. 
2 4 ~ t  times, this took a direct form, as when the prominent Amsterdam regent Corver married his 
daughter Maria Margaretha to his enemy Nicolaas Geelvinck as a peace offering. She was a rich 
gift: well-dowered, and 17 years younger than Geelvinck, who was a widower with five children. 
The marriage shifted Geelvinck into Corver's party, and culminated the latter's familial grip 
(Porta, 1975: 157-8). C. Schmidt's (1986) dissertation shows that when the heads of regent 
families were in financial straits, their daughters would marry wealthy but lower-status 
merchants. The new son-in-law would occupy a subaltern office by virtue of his marriage, but his 
son would take his place among the regency. 
25~nl ike  younger sons, daughters had no options for exit. The Dutch regents were Protestant, 
and thus the cloister was closed to their women. For an English-language discussion of early 
modern Dutch views of women's sexuality, see Schama (1987: Chapter Six). 
2 6 ~ o r  the landed elite in general, see Van Nierop (1984) and Marshall (1987: Chapter 3). 
Orangist dynastic concerns and the stadholders' policies of international alliance and war that 
these concerns entailed persisted alongside, and in tension with, the power of the regent family 
regimes. Can we make sense of the history of the Dutch Republic, including its very survival as an 
independent state, without considering the charismatic and organizational role of the'House of 
Orange in the war of independence against Spain? the impact on Dutch politics of Willem 111's 
dynastic marriage to his niece Mary Stuart and their ascension to the English throne as  "William 
and Mary" a t  the Glorious Revolution? Willem IVYs capacity to threaten the Amsterdam regents 
with English intervention, to induce them to agree to his reinstatement as  hereditary stadholder 
with expanded executive powers? Surely not. Nor can the ebb and flow of regent power be 
understood without reference to the rhythms of Orange family life, particularly the birth of 
posthumous children, and the minorities of heirs and attendant regencies that marked the two so- 
called "stadholderless eras". 
As patriarchal family and lineal networks and ideologies were woven into the web of 
patrimonial power, they constituted a Dutch equivalent of what the French historian Ralph Giesey 
has termed a "dynastic officialdom" (1977: 282) and what one might call, more generally, a 
-"familial state". Let me clarify what I mean by the term. First, as  I've just noted, gendered 
familial criteria were constitutive of political authority. This was still an era, in Ozment's 
memorable phrase, "when fathers ruled". Both the regents and the Princes of Orange grounded 
their political claims on the basis of hereditary qualification and patriarchal power, rather than on 
the basis of adherence to rational-legal procedure or other substantive standards of justice.27 
Second, the important political offices and privileges were distributed to men on the basis of their 
family ties and position. Sitting burgomasters allotted the higher city offices to family members, 
and lesser ones to their clients (Elias 1923: 201-2, 1937: 116-17; Vries 1977: 338-40), a s  well as 
exercizing jurisdiction over appointments to key positions a t  the provincial and Generality level, 
such as  deputies to the States-General and Raad van State. Amsterdam burgomasters had more 
offices to dispense (over 3200 in the mid-eighteenth century) than other towns did (Bussemaker 
1907), but their general procedure otherwise typified that of burgomasters elsewhere. In addition, 
many offices or privileges carried de fa& rights to dispense or sell other privileges (Swart 
1 9 4 9 ) . ~ ~  The stadholders and their lieutenants also sought to build familial patronage networks 
2 7 ~ i t h  reference to early modern England, see Schochet's (1975) discussion of the mobilization of 
patriarchal doctrine as  a defense of Stuart absolutism, and Pateman's (1988: Chapter 4) 
commentary and revision, which includes the principle of gender. 
2 S ~ h e  States-General tried to deal with the perceived expansion .of ofice sales with a 1715 
against "taking forbidden fits" and "corruption in the government" (Groot Placaet-Boeck 
1638-1796 v: 684). The directive proved unenforceable, and the States-General eventually 
with the offices and privileges under their jurisdiction (Gabriels 1989: 145-68, 202-22, 330, 36 1). 
In the case of the position of the stadholders, who were traditionally from the House of Orange, 
the potency of family criteria in state recruitment is obvious. 
Thus family representation in the state extended both horizontally, such as  in the town of 
Zutphen in 1747, when six of the twelve city aldermen belonged to one extended family, and over 
time, such as  in Hoorn, where the Breedhoff family held the principal magistracies and 
postmastership for three generations (Schama, 1977: 50-2). Both tendencies were exemplified in 
Amsterdam. Between 1698 and 1748 only 40 regents held the nine annually rotating senior 
offices of the city, and those regents were mainly members of the Corver clan (Geyl, 1949: 317). 
Joan Corver had assumed the leading position in the town council after the death of stadholder 
Willem 111 in 1702, a t  the outset of the second stadholderless period, and the number of his family 
members holding the office of mayor rose quickly: in 1707, of the nine sitting mayors, five 
belonged to the Corver family (Elias, 1923: 195). The Corvers intermarried with the Van 
Bambeeck, Hooft, Munter, and Van den Bempden families over the next 30 years, and the 
ramifying bloc held power until 1747-48 (Elias, 1903-05: cxxxix, Tab. 3-5; Porta, 1975). 
Familial factors even affected the size of the nascent state. At times regents sought to 
include more of their male relatives by means of expandig  state bodies beyond the traditional 
limits set by civic charters.29 Conversely, in many eighteenth-century towns, demographic 
shortfalls of men from "suitable" regent families produced dramatic and persistent vacancies in 
the town councils, rather than any broadening or relaxation of the gendered, familial criteria for 
qualification.30 Family position and family ties were not the sole determinant df state size, of 
course, but were potent enough to override traditional limitations. Finally, as  we shall we in 
Section 111, family principles were a major factor in structuring the articulation among the state's 
component parts. 
In such a state, we would expect to find characteristically gendered, familial patterns of 
conflict and alliance. Recruitment of relatives met with resistance from opposing, often newly- 
displaced, cliques of regents, and was accompanied by multi-generational conflicts among families 
endorsed the traffic by imposing special taxes, or amb-, on office-holders upon assumption of 
offices, in essence taking a cut of venal transactions. 
2 9 ~ n  outraged 1736 letter to the Holland Raad van State from Balthasar Huydecoper called 
attention to atteinpts by the Texel regents to do just that: Huydecoper accused the regents of 
appointing excess magistrates in order to incorporate their family members, and he pointed out in 
no uncertain terms that they were violating the town's 1509 charter (RU 67, #377). Femme 
Gaastra pointed me to the Huydecoper family archive. 
301n some cases, the vacancies were filled via recruitment of burghers married to regent 
daughters. More often, the regents simply recognized and accepted the shrinkage of the state 
body. 
inside the state. In the Amsterdam vroedschw, the rivalry between the Bickers and the hard- 
nosed Calvinist colonial merchant Reynier Pauw and his sons' faction continued throughout the 
first half of the seventeenth century.31 "Two houses, both alike in dignity ..." but even more in 
ambition. The family fault-lines of the Amsterdam vroedschm recrystallized in the early 
eighteenth century in the famous Sautijn Scandal, when a clique led by burgomaster Jeronimus de 
Haze de Gregorio, nephew of the well-connected Joannes Hudde, and opposed to the ascendant 
Corver family, exposed the extortionate office sales of Willem Sautijn, the brother of burgomaster 
Nicolaas Sautijn (member of the Van Bambeeck family clan and staunch Corverite), and his 
associate burgomaster J an  Six, also a member of the ruling Corver faction. Sautijn and Six had 
sold offices for thousands of guilders and divided the proceeds between themselves. In 1717-24, 
Sautijn had made a minimum of 22,820 fl. via office sales, including many in the East Indies 
Company. During the long and acrimonious trial (1724-31), many prominent regents were found 
guilty of selling offices, including burgomaster Jan  Trip; -Pieter Six, shepen  and later 
burgomaster; and Bonifacius Bisschop and Arend van der Burch, both members of the Admiralty 
Board. Nicolaas Sautijn even sold a gravedigger's office for 8,000 guilders in 1721, which may 
have been the cause of his not being elected burgomaster again after 1725. In an  ironic twist,.De 
Haze himself was found to have sold offices in 1723: among others, the office of East Indies 
Company boekhouder van de e a a f o r  the tidy sum of 16,000 guilders (AGA #5061, 641A). 
These leading lights of the regency ended up in court not because their actions were unusual, but 
because cycles of family conflict over leverage in the town council bared habitual but nominally 
illegal practices. 
When access to a city council seat had become definitive of regent family position, "family 
feuds" in the urban patriciates became more heated, eventually provoking an array of settlements 
in a number of cities. The distribution of city offices was formalized by means of written 
succession rules (sontracten van correspondentie), in which the regents laid out systems by which 
all eligible elite families would take turns getting mayoralties, East Indies Company directorships, 
and other corporate privileges. The contracts of correspondance were a brilliant institutional 
solution to the problem: they protected specific families' stake in an office, and guaranteed that all 
regent families' office genealogies would continue unbroken. Such contracts existed in Hoorn from 
the 1720s (Kooijmans, 1985), in Gouda from 1748 @e Jong, 1985), in Leiden from 1702-21 and 
1741 on (Prak, 1985: 264), in Amsterdam from 1752 (AGA #5059, 931, and elsewhere.32 The 
3 1 ~ o r  the rivalry between the Bickers and Pauws, see Elias (1923). 
321n Enkhuizen, in 1730, a typical agreement noted the desire of the regents "not to exclude any 
of the gentlemen-councillors from the directing of affairs" (cited in Kooijmans, 1985: 211). At 
contracts of correspondance regulated the membership in and control over corporate bodies, which 
were the conditions for capital accumulation, political power, and family honor. 
The regents' embrace of politico-economic privilege and office was closely associated with a 
turn to passive r e n t i e r ~ h i ~ . ~ ~  The fortunes of Leiden regents from 1700-80 are relatively typical 
in composition. More than 62% of their capital was invested in state bonds, and less than 1% in 
trade or production. By contrast, Leiden merchants and manufacturers invested 22% of their 
capital in trade or production (Prak 1985: 117). The tilt toward rentier status was accompanied 
by the admission of fewer merchants into the town councils from the late seventeenth century.34 
Regent families had successfully laid claim to political institutions, which became the de f ach  
inheritable property of various lineages. Intentionally or not, the male representatives of these 
families had succeeded in constituting a state which had the functional effect of reproducing their 
patrilineages. 35 
'In. Decline and Fall 
"Iskhis thy soft Family love 
Thy cruel Patriarchal pride 
'Planting thy'family alone, 
Destroying all the World beside." (Blake) 
times this system -was less effective in suppressing factionalism, such as  in Haarlem (De Jongste, 
1985: 177-81). 
3 3 ~ h i s  position was first argued convincingly by Roorda (1964), and his findings were expanded 
by Van Dijk and Roorda (1971). See also Burke (1974). 
340f the twenty-four new mayors in Amsterdam during 1718-48, for example, only were 
active merchants (Elias 1903-5: 238). The percent of burgomasters and councillors with no 
recorded occupation (who are conventionally assumed to live off their rents), and who owned a 
country seat, also rose over time, although not monotonically. There was a partial rollback of the 
percentage of rentiers and owners of country seats in 1672-1702 and 1748-95, due to Stadholders' 
interventions into the composition of the town council during national crises occasioned by 
attempted invasions (in 1672 and 1747) (Burke 1974). At those times, the absolutist tendency of 
patrimonial governance came to the fore, and Stadholders were able to replace ruling regent 
families with others more sympathetic to Orangist preoccupations. 
35~ome  Amsterdam families were unusually successful in the quest for the wealth, power, and 
prestige that accompanied family privilege and continuity. Ideally, we would be able to specify 
quantitatively the practices associated with the preservation of some patrilineages and the 
extinction of others. While I am engaged in some analysis along these lines, nothing will be 
definitive until the five meters of documents pertaining to Amsterdam regent appointments to 
state offices (1493-1813) are sifted. Thanks to Mr. Dudok van Hell for introducing me to these 
documents, available in the Amsterdam Gemeente Archief (AGA #5013), and for dissuading me 
from doing anything about them. 
When corporate family cliques captured offices and privileges in estatist patrimonial 
politicai economies, the effect on state policy and the political economy hinged on who they were 
and what they wanted: whether they were merchant capitalists, feudal landlords, landed capitalist 
aristocrats, or a plurality of elites in conflict or coalition, whether they wanted to expand colonial 
trade, or dreamed of continental territorial conquest. This is not to argue for an ahistorical 
"instrumental theory of the state", but to recognize the triangle of patriarchal family, dominant 
class, and political privilege that characterized early modern patrimonial systems in general and 
the Dutch case in particular. So in seventeenth-century Holland, when the merchant-capitalist 
Bicker family controlled the apparatus a t  the Amsterdam mayors' disposal, including the Indies 
Companies (when without too much hyperbole, one could say that a single family came closest to 
ruling the world) -- then Dutch dynastic officialdom favored the explosive development of 
mercantile capitalism on a world scale, advantaging Dutch elites and the Dutch population (but 
not the peoples of Brazil, Africa, India and Indonesia). So what went awry for the Netherlands? 
The usual explanation of the decline of the Dutch political economy in the eighteenth century 
attributes i t  to increased European economic competition, especially from England, and external 
military pressures.36 No doubt these factors should figure as parts of any complete explanation. 
Yet the above arguments also point beyond, to an understanding of how Dutch statemaking and 
the exercize of power were also undermined from within, in part by family practices and 
ideologies, and the accumulation and strengthening of privilege and position they made possible. 
We have seen that multiple family fiefdoms provoked cyclical feuding and, ultimately, 
interfamily settlements which established equilibrium in the familial state. In turn, these 
settlements reaffirmed and stabilized the localism of regent power structures. Taxes, naval policy, 
foreign and colonial policy remained subject to regent control, conducted via offices which the 
regents constituted, appointed and filled, and state development took on a pronounced local cast. 
Compare the over 3000 offices in Amsterdam alone to the relatively low total of central state 
offices, an estimated 100-200 in the early seventeenth century and only 300 in 1800 (with some 
of those newer offices actually appointed and paid by the provinces) (Gosman, 1988; 'T Hart, 
1988: 312-4). Particularly important were the naval and colonial apparatuses, which formed the 
political basis of Dutch mercantile strength and of the impressive military force the Netherlands 
could bring to bear on European and colonial foes. The regents and their provincial representatives 
established and headed the five duplicate admiralties, responsible for the collection of customs in 
their respective areas and for maintaining the navy (funded by customs proceeds), as well as the 
36~istor ians are still debating the character and timing of the Dutch decline. Van Dillen (1970) 
and Israel (1989) helpfully discuss sectoral trends in an international context, although neither 
attempts to integrate the phenomenon of economic decline with a focus on political shifts. 
multiple, redundant constituent chambers of the chartered companies, which were the major 
shapers of colonial policy.37 Contemporaries argued that the overlapping naval and colonial 
organization was cumbersome, and deplored the inflated expense due to its administrative costs 
('T Hart 1988: 325; Steur 1984). But the localism of the Dutch political economy was not a 
significant disadvantage at the outset of the early modern period: other European countries faced 
similar situations (Andrews 1984; Acerra and Meyer 1987), and the Dutch towns and their 
hinterlands were both relatively extensive and cohesive, and largely controlled by merchant 
capitalist families, rather than by landed feudal dynasties or unstable elite  coalition^.^^ By the 
latter part of the early modern period, however, when the Dutch were no longer operating from an 
advantaged position in the world political economy, this structure magnified the tensions 
occasioned by the decline of Dutch entrepot trade and the rise of British manufacturing. Each 
admiralty responded to the these pressures by lowering customs rates, hoping to wean trade away 
from its counterparts.39 Estimates of evasions of the customs range from 30-40% in Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam to almost 80% in Zeeland (Oldewelt 1953; Joh. de Vries 1958; Westermann 1948). 
The rate of evasion appears to have risen as well (Joh. de Vries 1958: 225-6), contributing to a 
drop in revenues, and to an insecure and inadequate supply of funds for the navyi40 Thus while 
the English navy doubled its tonnage from 1714 to 1760, deploying up to 10,000 men in 
peacetime and over 100,000 a t  the time of the American War (Brewer 1989: 33), the Dutch navy 
371n the Amsterdam chamber of the East Indies Company (VOC), a t  least 82% of the 77 men 
who served as  directors a t  some time between 1748 and 1794 were burgomasters, magistrates, or 
served in some other capacity on the vroedschu. Twenty-three (30%) were merchants or 
manufacturers, while 38 (49%) had no recorded occupation, and were thus almost certainly 
rentiers. At least 52, or 68% owned a country seat. Thus while there were proportionately more 
merchants and manufacturers in the VOC directorship than in the Amsterdam town council a t  
large, the figure had dropped dramatically from the 100% of the VOCYs inaugural years (Adams 
1990). The same shift characterized other chambers. Family ties continued to be the primary 
mechanism of transmitting control: in Rotterdam, for example, 66% of the directors stood in 
relation of son, father or grandfather to one another. Twenty-six directors were succeeded by a 
son, son-in-law or grandson (Kors 1988: 16). 
38~onathan Israel makes these two points forcefully in his excellent Dutch Primacy in World 
(1989). Trade 1585-1740 
3 9 ~ h e  customs were bringing in an  average of 1.5 million guilders a year in the early eighteenh 
century, less than the seventeenth-century average of 1.7 million (Fritschy 1988: 35). 
40~lthough the customs duties, or b v o o i e n  en l u  are most important here because of their 
direct impact on naval readiness, it is worth noting that the other important indirect tax remained 
regionalized and subject to local regent control. Excise duties m e e n e  middelen) more than 
quadrupled the price of basic commodities, and raised the price of Dutch wages and exported goods 
substantially (Aalbers 1977: 85). While the regencies structured and appointed the offices of tax 
receivers, there was little chance of instituting uniform and bureaucratically administered excise 
duties, or redressing the regressive character of the tax (Sickenga 1864; Diederiks 1977). 
was increasingly undermanned and underequipped, unskilled and technologically outdistanced (De 
Jonge 1858-62 iv: 1-440). The chartered company directorates, merged with the regent elites, 
were subject to similar dynamics, and proved equally impervious to reform from within and 
vulnerable to challenges from without.41 The changing class character and increasing familial 
exclusivity of the regent familiere~eringen curtailed state support of domestic manufacture and 
infrastructure a s  well a s  trade, which was the lifeblood of the Dutch political economy.42 
The formalization of the proprietary claims of regent families to state offices evoked 
struggles for change which gathered steam in local movements across the Netherlands in 1747-48. 
For the first time, organized pressures against the regents emerged from the burgher (burgerhik) 
strata "just below". &form movements in the northern provinces sought to eliminate office sales 
(Swart 1949: 77-8); those in Holland and the south, such a s  that of Rotterdam, demanded that 
office sales be opened to a wider public, with proceeds going not to the regents,-but to a truly 
public purse (Loveringh 1747; Groot'Placaet-Boeck 1'638-1796 vii: 106-8, 828-9). As elite families 
embraced their piece of the polity more tightly, the legitimating political symbolism of "heredity, 
birth and blood" conflicted sharply with the newer Enlightenment and popular attitudes of "merit, 
utility and reason" pervading eighteenth-century Europe.'While an analysis of the scope of the 
Patriot Revolution (1782-7) lies beyond the scope of this argument, it is striking to note that the 
sequence of municipal revolutions, led by small merchants and manufacturers, challenged the 
position of both the urban patriciates and the Prince of Orange (Te Brake, 1989; Palmer, 19591: 
364-70), in part on the basis of the familially-loaded charge of "nepotism". The stadholder and the 
regents joined together to resist democratic municipal elections and the elimination of their 
patrimonial prerogatives, and the "Dutch Spring" (Lente) was violently suppressed in a 
counterrevolution paid for by a loan of 90,000 pounds by the English state, and carried out by 
Prussian mercenaries. The conflicted and debilitated state fell to the French invasion of 1795, and 
was dismantled following a radical Patriot (French-sponsored) coup d'etat in 1 7 9 8 . ~ ~  The local 
family regimes, suppressed by the revolution, were reinstated after the French occupation was 
4 1 ~ a v a l  buildup would have necessitated, a t  minimum, the introduction of enforcement 
mechanisms for corporate bodies that lagged in their payments or refused to pay altogether, and 
eventually the elimination of those intermediary bodies. Fievamping the structure of colonial policy 
would have required changing the terms of the Union of Utrecht: its allotment of sovereignty to 
the provincial States, and the system of representation by which the urban regents constituted the 
policy-making members. 
4 2 ~ o r  an extended discussion of this point, see Adams (1990). 
43For complementary English-language surveys of the period, see Leeb (1973) and Schama 
(1977). 
over, and endured in some towns, such as Amsterdam, until definitively broken by the 
constitutional revolution of 1848. 
The failure of the Dutch e1ites.b innovatively respond to politico-economic decay and 
threat may seem puzzling. Certainly the regents and the stadholders were aware of politico- 
economic problems, and collectively considered ways to .address them (e.g. Hovy 1966). Yet the 
regents resisted substantial change in social arrangements, particularly when it involved loosening 
their grip on office and privilege.44 One plausible view is that, in refusing to consider 
restructuring or surrendering their privileges, the heads of elite families were acting with their 
own, or their families', or their class' economic benefit in view -- what's key is the isolation of "the 
economic" -- a position associated with neo-utilitarian (rational-choice) theory and certain forms of 
Marxism. However, it should be clear by now that patrimonial social arrangements are 
incompatible with principles-of individual cost-benefit accounting: actors are not able to identify 
consistently net private economic gains or losses.45 In addition, some of the goals desired by 
patrimonial family heads were economically ~ o u n t e r ~ r o d u c t i v e ~ ~  -- the actions of elites who 
wanted to hang onto patrimonial prerogatives either in the face of more lucrative opportunities or 
obselescence remain inexplicable within the theory (see for example Giesey . 1 9 7 7 ) . ~ ~  
4 4 ~ h e  "enlightened" reformer Simon van Slingelandt, secretary to the Raad van State and later 
Grand Pensionary (1727-361, proposed the most thoroughgoing set of reforms: that the grip of the 
regencies on offices be loosened, that rights to policy-making, taxation and adjudication of urban 
and provincial differences be vested in "neutral third parties" (i.e. central state officials). 
Slingelandt's proposal was taken up by the Qote 'Vergaderin~ of 1717, the second constitutional 
convention in the history of the -Republic, but no changes could be agreed upon, and none were 
adopted (Schutte 1988: 276-79; Veenendaal 1980: 28). 
4 5 ~ o r e  careful than some, North (1981) is careful to restrict the applicability of the theory to 
instances in which net private economic gains to actors are clearly discernable. In general, 
rational-choice theory is consistently applicable only to the economic costs and benefits that actors 
face under competitive conditions, given a specific set of goals and institutional arrangements. See 
Parsons' on the logical problem of "given", "random", or "exogenous" ends or preferences in 
utilitarianism (1968 [I9371 i: 64). 
4 6 ~ h i s  is obviously a complicated problem. In practice, many neo-utilitarians deal with it by 
reinterpreting actors' goals after the fact, categorizing them as rational. "It is important to note in 
this context that the economic approach is essentially tautological and accommodates all sets of 
values we care to include and all possible constraints," cautions Eggertsson (1990), himself 
sympathetic to this approach. 
471f we assume that regent family practices reduce to neo-utilitarian strategies, we run the risk of 
putting the causal cart before the horse. This also holds true when the concept of neo-utilitarian 
strategy is given a Marxian twist, and introduced under the guise of "class interest". In a . . 
rimns of the Familv. Private P ro~e r tv  and the State (1972 [18841), for example, Engels argues 
that the nuclear family, and associated systems of inheritance, came about and persists because it 
serves the function of reproducing private property, and thus the dominant class. This may be an  
effect of the nuclear family, but there is no evidence that it was or is a cause. Even within the 
Alternatively, elite family heads may have been unwilling to reshape certain received 
forms of politico-economic privilege because they deemed them best for their children, whom they 
loved. This approach carves out a theoretical space for the causal role of socially-structured affect, 
but tends to lead to anachronistic romanticization of elite families. Certainly some fathers and 
husbands did love their children, and their wives, and wanted to secure their futures, as E. P. 
Thompson has written, "to try to throw forward some grid which will support them" (1976: 346). 
Yet Thompson) the metaphor of the grid is aptly double-edged; grids also restrict and entrap. 
The boundaries of the normative structures that patterned family social position are a s  always 
most evident when transgressed. Parents were prepared to punish or disown children who 
threatened family position and honor, and the high courts to back them up.48 
Neither the "romantic" nor the "rational-choice" perspective problematizes gender and age 
power relations within the family, or enables us to deal with the traces of such relations in politics. 
Instead of taking either of these analytical paths, I want to insist on the nonrational, 
socioemotional component in our ideal-typical motivational set of the patrimonial family head. His 
ideological identification with the honor of the lineage was central to his self-representation, and 
was constitutive of his dual desire to both support his children economically and emotionally, and 
to deploy them as pawns. It was embedded in the patrimonial package of family, dominant class 
and state, and embodied in genealogies of office. My point here has not been to explain the genesis 
of this belief system, which merits an article in itself, but to begin to draw out its explanatory 
possibilities, and (in the following section) the implications for theories of early modern European 
politico-economic development. 
IV. Conclusion 
States can be said to be "in the making" when properly political functions are anchored in 
"a relatively centralized, differentiated, and distinct organization that controls the principal 
terms of the theory, Engels cannot explain one key step: why fathers should want to pass on their 
property to their "own" (biological) sons -- anybody's sons could serve the economic purpose. This 
nonrational preference remains exogenous to, and inexplicable within, Marxism as  it is currently 
understood. 
4 8 ~ e e  Schama (1987: 441-45). Note that parents did not generally arrange marriages, but they 
did exercize veto rights over their children's choice of spouse. The point can be illustrated by 
another example from the history of the Bicker clan. In 1650, the Amsterdam burgomaster 
Andries Bicker, who had refused his consent to the proposed marriage of his 26-year-old son 
Gerard to Alida Koninks on the grounds that the Koninks' social status and fortune was too far 
below the Bickers', brought a case against his defiant son before the magistrates of the Hoge 
Raad, who decided in the father's favor. Gerard and Alida finally married in 1656, after both 
Bicker parents were dead d after Gerard had asked the Raad, in loco lineagensis, to reverse its 
decision, and been successful (Smidt and Gall, 1985: 37-9). Only in 1809, after the fall of the 
Dutch & r e g i w  were children legally allowed veto rights over their parents' choice of spouse. 
concentrated means of coercion within a contiguous and clearly-bounded territory" (Tilly, 1985). 
Then the more "developed" the state, the more that political activities are organized in specific 
institutions, and the more that roles in the state sector are handed out according to a set of 
distinct, specialized requirements, rather than according to incumbents' roles in other institutions 
(Eisenstadt, 1963: 8-10; 1966: 3) -- including the family.-49 In patrimonial systems, I have been 
suggesting, both the relationship among state positions and the legitimation of the nascent state 
are in part familially defined. Thus patrimonial systems should be conceptually distinguished from 
both rational-legal bureaucratic systems, and patronage systems, in which holders of offices are 
recruited largely according to particularistic -- including familial -- criteria but in which offices 
themselves are bureaucratically structured. Patrimonial systems have their own sui ~ e n e r i s  
characteristics and developmental dynamics. 
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT.HERE) 
The differentiated development of a political structure does not necessarily make it 
'"functional" or.even viable: states can be unmade as  well, along the same dimensions, again, 
familial ones. In the Dutch case, the growing urgency of the demands placed on the patrimonial 
state by foreign economic competition and military threat encouraged endogenous devolutionary 
tendencies. Economic resources, power and legitimacy flowed to particularistic regent familial 
reemes at the expense of the overall politico-economic structure in which those local regimes were 
embedded, however insecurely. The extent of coordination among key state elements --the urban 
and provincial governments, the regents and the stadholder, the multiple family regimes -- 
declined, and processes of politico-economic disintegration set in, rendering the Dutch state more 
vulnerable and undermining its adaptability to external pressures. Had politico-economic privileges 
and offices not functioned as the patrimony of elite families, I would argue, counterfactually, 
reformers would have been more capable of introducing measures to address politico-economic 
pressures a t  home and abroad, before the epochal revolutionary upheavals of the 1780s presented 
another, more drastic, solution. 
My claim, that gendered family practices imparted specific dynamics to Dutch societal 
development, is necessarily an open one, calling for comparative study. One set of contrasting 
claims would revolve around other transitional ancien r e ~ m e ,  or patrimonial, elites, whose 
capacity to accumulate economic resources hinged on their membership in and control of corporate 
4 9 ~ o r  helpful discussions of dimensions of state development, see Tilly (1990); Eisenstadt (1963: 
26-9), and Parsons (1960; 1966: 21-5). However, none of these texts takes gender into account as  
a structural principle. 
bodies. Were they recruited into and did they exercize control over those bodies in part  due to their 
entwined statuses a s  .m and a s  current or prospective m l v  heads, a s  were the Dutch regents 
and stadholders? Did the lack of differentiation between elite families and state privileges limit 
politico-economic development in similar ways?'These questions suggest a restructuring of 
research agendas into the relations between the dynastic dynamics of patrimonial rulers and 
elites, and the consequences of those dynamics for state formation and policy. An equally 
important comparative claim would be, of course, that innovative elite family practices and 
attitudes contributed to the flight from patrimonial privilege in seventeenth-century England, and 
helped stabilize political power there in the eighteenth century. I would have to show that family 
practices were one source of the English elite's notorious longevity, the comparative stability of the 
organization of political power and evolutionary changes in state government. In any case, one 
implication of my argument here, if it is correct, is that the variabilitv in the central trajectories of 
patrimonial societies, whether development or devolution, can be explained in part by variations in 
gendered family practices, such as  purchase of venal office 'for the males in the family, patrilineal 
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